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BANKRUPTCY ON THE BLACKBOARD
"A picture is worth a thousand words."'
UND School of Law Adjunct Faculty Member John Foster has taught
various commercial law courses at the Law School since 1981, and one
such course for second and third year law students is Bankruptcy. The class
has historically met at 8 A.M. two days a week, and Professor Foster has a
habit of arriving prior to 7 A.M. on those days to fill the blackboards and the
whiteboards with his own graphic and "cartoon" interpretations of the theo-
retical and practical workings of the Bankruptcy Code. Professor Foster
does his drawings "fresh" each class day, and varies the drawings from
semester to semester. He does not like computer-generated images or other
electronic graphics recall systems, because those, he says, take away from
the immediacy of "hot on the board" drawings.
Professor Foster and his students have discovered there is considerable
educational value in converting the overwhelming, massive, and mysterious
federal legalese of Bankruptcy into pictures and illustrations which allow
important points to be taught quickly and efficiently, and allow the students
to brand into their brains memorable visual depictions of theories, concepts,
and procedures, which the students can carry with them into practice.
It was the late and beloved Professor Randy Lee who suggested to the
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW that a collection of Professor Foster's
"cartoons and graphics" might provide education as well as entertainment to
the bench, bar, and other readers of the North Dakota Law Review.
So, without further adieu, we present a collection of blackboard and
whiteboard graphics from Professor Foster's bankruptcy course, with each
drawing preceded by a short commentary, condensed from Professor
Foster's lectures, explaining the graphics.2
1. See www.napoleon.org/en/space/information bulletin/Napoleon bulletinmodel.htm (pos-
iting that Napoleon Bonaparte spoke this famous quote possibly documented in EMMANUEL LAS
CASES, MEMORIAL DE SAINTE-HELENE (La seuil, 1999) (1823).
2. Professor Foster's graphics depict the Bankruptcy Court as flying the "Jolly Roger Skull &
Crossbones" flag. When asked about this, Professor Foster replies that the pirate ship death's
head logo is intended to make a humorous comment on three aspects of Bankruptcy. First, the
gnashing of teeth between the Federal Judiciary and Congress back in 1982, when the Supreme
Court declared then-Bankruptcy Court pervasive jurisdiction unconstitutional as a violation of
Article III, brought to mind that a lot of folks in the legal community viewed the powerful Bank-
ruptcy Judges (ultimately declared too powerful) somewhat as "JURISDICTIONAL PIRATES."
Second, debtors in bankruptcy generally suffer from EXTREME FINANCIAL MALNUTRITION
(skull & bones). Third, creditors involved in a bankruptcy of a customer often feel their own
BONES ARE BEING PICKED CLEAN by the process.
2005]
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I. TYPES OF BANKRUPTCY AND THE ROLE OF THE TRUSTEE
There are two types of bankruptcy: liquidation and rehabilitation. In
liquidation, a bankruptcy trustee sells off non-exempt assets and pays credi-
tors with the sale proceeds. In rehabilitation, the debtor continues his work,
or his business continues to operate and pays creditors with earned income.
Chapter 7 is the basic liquidation section. In liquidation, the debtor's
purpose is to obtain a discharge (i.e., cancellation) of his debts and obtain a
"fresh start." The debtor turns over all of his non-exempt property, and the
Trustee gently "kicks" the debtor away from the bankruptcy estate and off
into the sunset to make his fresh start (see graphic next page). The Trustee,
now in possession of the bankruptcy estate, sells off the former debtor pro-
perty and converts it to cash, which he then distributes pro rata among
unsecured creditors.
Chapter 11 Business Reorganization, Chapter 13 Individual Income
Earner Debt Adjustment, and Chapter 12 Family Farmer Debt Adjustment
are the Bankruptcy Code's primary rehabilitation sections. The debtor re-
mains in possession of his property and continues to operate the business,
work at his job, or farm the land. The debtor pays creditors using income
generated by the business, the job, or the farm, and creditors are paid ac-
cording to a written plan, confirmed by the court. The debtor ultimately re-
ceives a discharge of debts not paid by the plan when the debtor gets the
plan confirmed (Chapter 11) or when the debtor completes payments under
the plan (Chapters 13 and 12).
In a Chapter 11, there is generally no Trustee appointed unless there
has been fraud or gross mismanagement by the debtor. Usually, the debtor
remains in control of the business as a "debtor-in-possession." The debtor
files a plan of reorganization, the creditors vote whether to accept or reject
the plan, the court confirms the plan, and the debtor goes forward operating
the business and paying the creditors according to the dictates of the
confirmed plan.
In Chapters 133 and 12 a Trustee is appointed, but the Trustee remains
in somewhat of an "ivory tower" and does not take possession of the
debtor's property, as the Trustee would in a Chapter 7. Instead, the debtor
remains in possession of his property, continues to work his job or work the
farm, and pays the Trustee a portion of the income earned at the job or on
the farm according to the dictates of a confirmed plan of rehabilitation. The
3. In a Chapter 13, the debtor receives a broader discharge than is afforded by the other
Chapters of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2000). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 will
reduce this broad discharge considerably. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
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Trustee distributes the money received from the debtor to the creditors,
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II. JURISDICTION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: "TOO
MUCH" AT FIRST UNDER THE 1978 CODE
When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, effective in
October 1979, it replaced the old bankruptcy referee system with a court
system presided over by Bankruptcy Judges appointed by the President for
fourteen-year terms.
Bankruptcy Judges were given pervasive jurisdictional authority under
the 1978 Code. They had original and exclusive jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy cases-i.e., Chapter 7 Liquidation, Chapter 11 Business Reorgani-
zation, and Chapter 13 Individual Income Earner Rehabilitation (Chapter 12
was not enacted until the mid-1980's).
Bankruptcy Judges were also given original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all civil actions arising in or related to bankruptcy. Such civil actions
included anything of a financial nature affecting the debtor and his
creditors. In short, just about everything was subject to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, including tort claims, divorce, breach of contract actions, anti-
trust cases, tax litigation, real estate boundary disputes, breach of warranty
claims, debt collection cases, race discrimination and sexual harassment
suits, foreclosure cases, product liability suits, will contests, etc. Whether a
civil matter arising in or "related to" bankruptcy involved $10 or
$10,000,000, it did not matter. Jurisdiction was all encompassing under the
1978 Code.
Note that the under the 1978 Code, Bankruptcy Judges, again
appointed only for fourteen-year terms, had more jurisdiction then Federal
District Judges, who are appointed for life under Article III of the Consti-
tution. Unlike District Court Judges, Bankruptcy Judges were not restricted
by any amount-in-controversy limits, federal question limits, and diversity
of citizenship rules.
The Congressional concept of all-pervasive jurisdiction came to a
"crash and bum" in 1982, in Northern Pipeline Construction Company v.
Marathon Pipeline Company,4 which in essence held that bankruptcy juris-
diction, as fashioned by Congress in 1978, violated Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. 5
As a result of Northern Pipeline, the Bankruptcy Courts operated under
an "emergency order" for jurisdiction from 1982 forward, while Congress
4. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
5. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87.
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went back to the jurisdictional drawing board. Congress "fixed" the
situation in the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal Judgeship Act.
6
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6. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 336 (1984)
(codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (2000)); Pub. L. 98-598, 92 Stat. 2667 (1984) (codified as 28
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III. BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION TODAY: THE CONGRESSIONAL
"FIX" CREATED AFTER NORTHERN PIPELINE
Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act,
Congress made Bankruptcy Courts "units" of the Federal District Courts.
No longer does the President appoint Bankruptcy Judges, but now the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal appoint Bankruptcy Judges for fourteen-year terms.
In the 1984 legislation, 7 which is law today, the Federal District Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases-i.e.,
Chapters 7, 11, 13 and 12-and also original but not exclusive jurisdiction
over all civil proceedings arising in or related to cases under bankruptcy.
The Federal District Court is empowered to refer bankruptcy matters to
the Bankruptcy Judge. Matters referred to a Bankruptcy Judge are divided
between "core" matters and "non-core" matters. A core proceeding arises
directly in connection with the purpose and concept of bankruptcy, and can-
not stand on its own except in the context of a bankruptcy case. Examples
of core proceedings include motions for relief from automatic stay, confir-
mation of a reorganization or rehabilitation plan, administration of the
bankruptcy estate, trustee proceedings to avoid preferences, setoffs, fraudu-
lent transfers, liens not timely or properly perfected, etc.
Non-core proceedings include matters not directly arising in or under
the particular bankruptcy case, and which could stand as causes on their
own in other courts. Examples are tort and breach of contract cases,
divorce actions, anti-trust and tax litigation, boundary disputes, warranty
claims, collection actions, race and sex discrimination and harassment suits,
foreclosure, product liability actions, etc.
In a core proceeding, the Bankruptcy Judge makes final findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and orders for judgment. In non-core proceedings,
the Bankruptcy Judge may hear the matter but can only make proposed
findings, conclusions, and orders, with the U.S. District Court making final
versions.
The U.S. District Court and the Bankruptcy Court may, and in some
instances must, abstain from a non-core matter, and send it back to State
Court. Permissive abstention is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) in
the interests of justice or in the interests of respect for state law. Abstention
is mandatory if a litigant timely files a motion for abstention and
demonstrates criteria required in § 1334(c)(2).
U.S.C. § 1334 (2000)).
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 1334 (2000) (providing the 1984 language discussed in this
section).
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IV. APPEALS FROM BANKRUPTCY COURT
In 1994 Congress mandated that if a Federal Judicial District has suf-
ficient resources, it must create a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, consisting of
three Bankruptcy Judges, to hear appeals from the Bankruptcy Court.8
In a federal jurisdiction which has created a Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel ("BAP"), appeals from the Bankruptcy Court are directed to the
BAP, and if an appellant or appellee has grounds to disagree with the result
at the BAP, then the matter may be appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals.
If a party makes a timely election, the party may appeal from the Bank-
ruptcy Court to the U.S. District Court, rather than to the BAP. If litigants
have grounds to disagree with the result at the U.S. District Court, they can
then appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
In those jurisdictions which do not yet have a BAP, an appeal from
Bankruptcy Court goes to U.S. District Court, and if further appeal is then
needed, on to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The United States Supreme Court has ultimate jurisdiction, of course,
for appeals from the Circuit Court of Appeals.
0 BANKRUPTCY APPEALS





\ o ,. (SAP)
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2000) (detailing Bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction).
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V. THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND THE CO-DEBTOR STAY:
AUTOMATIC STAY APPLICABLE IN ALL CHAPTERS OF
BANKRUPTCY, CO-DEBTOR STAY AVAILABLE ONLY IN
CHAPTERS 13 AND 12
Upon filing of a bankruptcy petition, the debtor and the debtor's
property enjoy the protection of the Automatic Stay of Bankruptcy Code §
362.9 Collection efforts by creditors, contact with the debtor, and lien per-
fection or recordation attempts are instantly restrained when the Stay goes
into effect.
The Stay is broad in scope. Prohibited creditor activities include col-
lection lawsuits at any stage, enforcement of judgments, enforcement or
perfection of liens, Dunning letters, self-help repossession and other non-
judicial remedies, setoffs, default notices, and any other attempts to disturb
or take money or property from the debtor or the bankruptcy estate.
Exceptions to the Automatic Stay are criminal prosecutions, certain
alimony and child support modification and enforcement activities, UCC
perfection of purchase money security interests during the grace period,
governmental regulatory and police actions, HUD foreclosures, tax notices,
and paternity actions (but even these exceptions may be stayed under the
equitable power of the court in Bankruptcy Code § 10510).
The Stay terminates when property of the bankruptcy estate is no
longer such, when the bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or the debtor is
denied or granted discharge, or upon request of a creditor seeking relief
from the Stay.
Relief from the Stay requires the creditor to show either "cause," such
as lack of adequate protection of the creditor's lien, or that the debtor has no
equity in the property and the property sought to be relieved from the Stay
is not necessary to an effective reorganization or rehabilitation.
In Chapters 13 and 12, non-bankrupt persons are protected by the
special Co-Debtor Stay imposed by Bankruptcy Code §§ 1301 and 1201, in
addition to the Automatic Stay applicable to the bankrupt debtor and the
debtor's property." Non-bankrupt co-debtors include guarantors, co-
signers, co-makers, joint obligors, sureties, partners, etc. The Co-Debtor
Stay applies only to consumer debts (and not commercial or agricultural
business debts).
A creditor may seek relief from the Co-Debtor Stay if the debtor's
Chapter 13 or Chapter 12 Plan does not intend to fully repay the debt, the
9. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1301 (2000).
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non-bankrupt co-debtor (and not the debtor) actually received the consid-
eration for the debt, or that the Stay will "irreparably harm" the creditor's
interest.
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VI. AVOIDABLE PREFERENCES
The bankruptcy Trustee has the ability to undo and take back from a
creditor any money, property, lien, or anything else of value which the
creditor obtained during the ninety day "eve of bankruptcy" and which re-
sulted in the creditor receiving preferential treatment over other creditors.12
The graphic on the next page illustrates the elements needed by the
Trustee to prove an avoidable preference. In the graphic, a $10,000 loan
made in January is repaid in full in August, and then the debtor files bank-
ruptcy in October. The Trustee determines that an unsecured creditor
should receive only ten cents on the dollar on his claim. In order to estab-
lish the avoidable preference and recover against the creditor, the Trustee
must show the following five elements:
1. That there has been a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor of
money, property, a lien, or anything of value. The transfer can be volun-
tarily made by the debtor, or involuntarily extracted from the debtor by
zealous creditor action or through state judicial process such as a sheriff's
execution. In the graphic on the next page, the transfer occurs in August
when the debtor parts with (voluntarily or involuntarily) $10,000 worth of
money, property, lien, or other value and it gets into the hands of the
creditor.
2. That the transfer is made on account of antecedent debt (i.e., a debt
which arose prior to the time of the transfer). In the graphic, the debt arose
back in January when the debtor signed the promissory note and obtained
the loan proceeds.
3. That the transfer is made within ninety days of bankruptcy, which is
colloquially known as the "eve of bankruptcy." If the transfer is made to an
insider, such as a relative or business associate, the Trustee can reach back
an entire year, rather than just ninety days, prior to the bankruptcy to undo
the transaction.
4. That the transfer is made while the debtor is insolvent (the debtor is
presumed insolvent during the ninety days prior to bankruptcy).
5. And that the transfer enables the creditor to receive more than the
creditor would have received in a liquidation bankruptcy, had the transfer
not occurred. In the graphic, the Trustee has determined that unsecured
creditors should receive only ten cents on the dollar. The creditor in the
graphic, on the other hand, received at the time of the transfer in August full
repayment of the $10,000 loan. The Trustee would take the position that he
12. See II U.S.C. § 547 (2000).
[VOL. 81:263
2005] BANKRUPTCY ON THE BLACKBOARD
should have received only $1,000 (i.e., 10%). Therefore, the Trustee can
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VII. STRONGARM POWER OF THE TRUSTEE: THE ABILITY OF
THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE TO AVOID TRANSFERS AND
LIENS WHICH ARE NOT PROPERLY RECORDED OR
PERFECTED IN THE SAME WAY AN INNOCENT PURCHASER
OR LIEN CREDITOR COULD DO SO UNDER STATE LAW
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)13 gives the Trustee, as of the date of the
bankruptcy filing, all of the same rights as would have been available to a
"hypothetical bona fide purchaser" or "hypothetical lien creditor" of the
debtor's property under State Law. If a lien upon or transfer of the debtor's
property would have been avoidable by such a purchaser or lien creditor
under State Law, the Trustee can avoid it under Bankruptcy Law.
In the graphic on the next page, the owner of the farm and the tractor
grants to a bank a real estate mortgage on the farm and a UCC security
interest in the tractor. The bank fails to record the mortgage or records it
with an erroneous legal description. Also the bank fails to file a UCC
Financing Statement or files it in the wrong place.
Under State Law, an innocent bona fide purchaser of the farm or the
tractor would be able to buy those items from the owner free and clear of
the mortgage lien and the security interest of the bank, because a lien search
would reveal nothing in the public record. Similarly, under State Law, an
innocent lien creditor, such as a sheriff with an execution levy or a lawsuit
creditor with a judgment lien, would take a first lien position on the
property, because again nothing appears in the public record indicating the
existence of a superior lien.
Under Bankruptcy Law, the Trustee gets the same ability to ignore the
bank's mortgage and security interest as the innocent buyer and the
innocent lien creditor would have under State Law. Under Bankruptcy
Law, the date of the bankruptcy filing is deemed to be the equivalent of the
State Law date of sale to an innocent bona fide purchaser, or the date of the
attachment of an execution or judgment lien imposed by a lien creditor.
The Trustee, wearing the hat of the innocent buyer or lien creditor, checks
the public record, the same as a buyer or lien creditor would do under State
Law when purchasing or liening up a piece of property, and, finding no
recorded or perfected interest in the public record, the Trustee gets to
"strongarm" the property into the bankruptcy estate, free and clear of the
bank's mortgage lien and security interest. The bank is rendered an
"unsecured" creditor.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
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VIII. TRUSTEE'S SETOFF AVOIDANCE
A classic setoff occurs when a borrower owes the bank money on a
defaulted loan, and the bank owes the borrower money because the
borrower has a checking or savings account with funds deposited at the
bank. The bank reaches into the deposit account and pulls out money to
pay down the defaulted loan.
A bankruptcy Trustee may undo a setoff by a bank against a debtor's
deposit checking or savings account, if the setoff occurred within the ninety
day "eve of bankruptcy" and if the bank "improves its position" from ninety
days before bankruptcy to the date of the setoff. 14
To determine whether a bank has "improved its position," the Trustee
through discovery finds out exactly how much money was in the debtor's
deposit checking or savings account exactly ninety days prior to the
bankruptcy filing, and also finds out exactly how much was owed on the
debtor's loan to the bank exactly ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Leading up to the day the bank performed the setoff, if the bank during
that timeframe "improves its position" in the debtor's checking or savings
account, such as by accepting additional deposits, and if the bank
"improves its position" on the debtor's loan, such as by accepting from the
debtor voluntary payments lowering the balance owed, the Trustee adds the
two "improvements" in position together to arrive at the amount he can
demand that the bank disgorge to the bankruptcy estate.
In the graphic on the next page, ninety days before the debtor files
bankruptcy he has only $10,000 in his checking account, and he owes
$50,000 to the bank on his loan. Leading up to the day of the setoff on the
eve of bankruptcy when the bank ultimately takes $30,000 out of the
checking account and sets it off against the defaulted loan, the debtor's
bank account gets fattened, presumably with additional deposits, and the
account balance goes up to $30,000 by the day of the setoff. In addition,
the loan gets reduced, presumably through regular payments, down to a
loan balance of $40,000 by the day of the setoff.
In short, from ninety days before bankruptcy to the day of setoff the
bank improves its position by $20,000 in the bank account (starting with a
balance of $10,000 and accepting additional deposits for a total available
of $30,000 on setoff day), and the bank improves its position by $10,000 on
the loan (starting with an exposure of $50,000, reduced by regular
payments to $40,000 on setoff day).
14. I1 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
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Adding the two "improvements" in position together-$20,000 worth
of deposits plus $10,000 worth of loan payments-the Trustee determines
he can demand that the bank remit to the bankruptcy estate a total of
$30,000. He can sue the bank if it doesn't.
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IX. TARDY PERFECTION AVOIDANCE: THE TRUSTEE'S ABILITY
TO CHANGE REALITY BY "DEEMING" CERTAIN LIENS THAT
ARE TARDILY PERFECTED TO HAVE ARISEN ON THE
PERFECTION DATES
A most unusual avoiding power the Trustee has in a bankruptcy case is
the ability to avoid a lien that was "tardily" perfected, even though it was
perfected properly under state law. Bankruptcy Code § 547(e)15 permits the
Trustee to invalidate a lien, which, although perfected by the time bank-
ruptcy is filed, was nevertheless perfected "tardily" after the actual trans-
action occurred. The Trustee "deems" the lien as not having been granted
on the date it actually was given by the debtor, but rather on the later day of
perfection. If the perfection then happens to have occurred during the
ninety days prior to bankruptcy, the Trustee can use § 547(a)16 avoidable
preference powers to invalidate the lien.
In the graphic on the next page, debtor borrows money from the bank
in January, and to secure the loan grants to the bank a security interest in
his bulldozer. The bank, however, neglects to file a UCC Financial State-
ment at this time. In August the bank realizes that it had earlier failed to
perfect with a UCC-l filing. The bank hurriedly runs a UCC-1 to the court-
house. The bank thinks "Whew!"
In October debtor files bankruptcy and the Trustee determines that it is
a "no asset" bankruptcy and unsecured creditors would receive zero pay-
ments. The Trustee is able to avoid the security interest on the bulldozer,
thereby rendering the bank an unsecured creditor, by "deeming" the secu-
rity interest on the dozer to have been given not on the day it was actually
given in January, but rather on the day the bank perfected the security
interest in August. That is, the Trustee, through this fiction, creates a new
reality, which results in an unsecured loan having been made in January,
and a security interest having been given in August to convert an unsecured
loan to a secured one.
So what? Bankruptcy was not filed until October, and the bank was
perfected by then, albeit tardily, right? True, but by deeming the lien to
have arisen in August, within ninety days of bankruptcy, while the loan was
made back in January and is now deemed to be on an unsecured basis, the
Trustee may now void the lien as an avoidable preference. The now
"unsecured" loan is an antecedent debt, the "tardy" security interest is a
transfer to a creditor, which is deemed to have occurred within ninety days
15. 11 U.S.C. § 5 47(e) (2000).
16. Id. § 547(a).
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of bankruptcy while the debtor was presumed insolvent, and having deter-
mined that unsecured creditors will receive no money in this bankruptcy,
the Trustee uses the preference to avoid the lien because the creditor is
deemed to have received more by taking a lien on the bulldozer than he
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X. PROVING CREDITOR CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
In order for a creditor to share in any distribution by the Trustee from a
bankruptcy estate, the creditor must file a Proof of Claim. 18 (A Proof of
Claim is not required in Chapter 11, however, if the debtor has properly
scheduled the creditor claim in the bankruptcy petition, § 1111.) Often
times, in typical consumer Chapter 7 cases, the Clerk of Bankruptcy Court
notifies creditors, at the time of notification of the first meeting of creditors,
that no Proofs of Claim should be filed because the case appears to be a "no
asset" case where no distribution will be forthcoming. If the Clerk, Trus-
tee, or the Court locates assets later, however, creditors are notified to then
file their Proofs.
Where there is a net estate, if all creditors do not file their Proofs of
Claim, the ones who do receive a greater pro rata share of the estate. This
often happens in bankruptcy cases, where many creditors either neglect or
otherwise fail to file their Proofs of Claim (believing that in the end they
either won't get anything or it will be a paltry pennies-on-the-dollar recov-
ery). Those who do file, however, then get a windfall benefit from the ne-
glect or failure of the others.
In the graphic on the next page, there are 100 creditors holding claims
totaling $100,000 against a bankruptcy estate, which only has a net $10,000
to distribute. If all of the creditors would file their Proofs of Claim, each
creditor would receive 10% of its claim, or "Ten Cents on the Dollar."
Assume, however, that only 3 creditors file their Proofs of Claim, and
the other 97 fail to do so.
Creditor A has a filed Proof of Claim for $3,000, Creditor B has a filed
Proof for $2,000, and Creditor C has a filed Proof for $1,000. Out of the
net estate, the trustee can pay creditors A, B, and C the total amount of their
claims (i.e., 100 Cents on the Dollar), and the Trustee still has $4,000 left
out of the original $10,000 net distributable estate.
Where does the $4,000 surplus go? To the debtor.19 If the other 97
creditors find out about this, there might be some gnashing of teeth.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2000).
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XI. OBTAINING LOANS AND CREDIT WHILE IN BANKRUPTCY
In rehabilitation bankruptcy cases such as Chapters 11, 12, and 13, it is
often necessary for the Debtor-In-Possession or the Trustee to obtain loans
or other financial credit to carry on the business. Naturally existing credi-
tors who are owed money might be reluctant to lend more money or give
any new credit to the Debtor or the Trustee. An outside lender would obvi-
ously be hesitant to deal with a bankrupt entity. Recognizing this reluc-
tance, Bankruptcy Code § 36420 provides some inducements and incentives
for either existing creditors or new lenders to provide loans or credit to a
bankrupt entity. These inducements and incentives are summarized in the
graphic on the next page.
The Bankruptcy Court is authorized to grant to lenders willing to deal
with the bankrupt entity an administrative expense priority for the repay-
ment of any credit (No. I on the graphic). Or, the Court can even grant a
super-administrative expense priority, ahead of all other administrative
expense priorities (No. 2 on the graphic).
Another alternative is for the Court to grant the new lender a lien on
property of the bankruptcy estate not already subject to a lien (No. 3 on the
graphic), or, the Court can grant a junior lien on property already subject to
liens held by other creditors (No. 4 on the graphic).
Finally if all else fails and the new lender is reluctant to grant credit
even after the foregoing inducements, the Court, after notice and hearing,
may authorize a lien to be granted to the new lender which is superior to
existing liens (No. 5 on the graphic). This has the effect of "squeezing
down" the priorities of the existing liens, and naturally those existing credi-
tors are going to want adequate protection for their liens (at this point,
perhaps the Bankruptcy Court will grant these existing creditors admini-
strative expense priorities or liens on other properties as adequate protection
for their having lost their initial priority positions by reason of the new
lender's super lien).
Heard in the corridors outside the Bankruptcy Court after existing
lienholders were pushed into an inferior position by a super lien granted to a
new lender: "If the adequate protection we got was so darned adequate,
why didn't the other guy take it?"
20. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000).
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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
XII. USE OF COLLATERAL BY A CHAPTER II DEBTOR
A business filing Chapter 11 reorganization wants to continue doing
business, so naturally it needs to use its equipment, sell its product, pay its
employees, and do everything associated with the running of a business. If
assets depreciate while they are in use, or cash proceeds of collateral are
used to pay employees and other operating expenses, any secured creditors
with liens on those assets have a right to demand adequate protection and
need to be heard on that issue. Bankruptcy Code § 36321 sets forth the rules
as to when notice and a hearing are required for creditors to have their
say. 22
In the graphic on the next page, Fly by Night Air has filed Chapter 11.
Various financial institutions have perfected security interests in the air-
line's equipment including jet planes, in accounts including cash receipts
and credit card receipts for ticket sales to the flying public, and in the re-
sulting cash in the airline's deposit accounts used to pay employees and the
operating the expenses of the business.
Use of collateral in a Chapter 1 1 debtor's ordinary course of business
does not require notice and hearing to the creditors. What does an airline
do in the ordinary course of business? It flies people and cargo around the
world. So, regular flights, takeoffs, and landings are permitted without a
hearing.2 3 (No. I on the graphic.) Also, in the ordinary course of an air-
line's business, it sells tickets to the flying public and takes in credit card
and cash receipts in exchange for those-tickets. Because that is the ordinary
course of business, no hearing is required and the airline may dispense tick-
ets and collect money (but not spend it) without consent of the creditors. 24
(No. 2 on the graphic.)
Fly By Night Air of course needs to pay its pilots, flight attendants, and
mechanics, but that requires cash to issue paychecks. The use of cash col-
lateral, if it is subject to a secured party's lien, is not permitted unless there
is notice and a hearing allowing the cash lienholders to have their say and
argue about adequate protection. So while paying employees might be in
the ordinary course of business, nevertheless the use of cash requires a
hearing.2 5
In order to raise a bundle of quick cash, and get leaner and meaner in
its reorganization, Fly By Night decides to sell off to Rich Dude a part of its
21. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
22. Id. § 363(c)(1).
23. id.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 363(c)(2).
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jet plane fleet and its profitable shuttle service air route between Gotham
City and Metropolis. Since an airline is not ordinarily in the business of
selling planes or air routes (rather it is in the business of flying planes on air
routes), such a sale would not be in the ordinary course of business, and
therefore notice and a hearing are required before the sale may be con-
summated. 26 If the bankruptcy court approves the sale, secured creditor
liens will of course attach to the proceeds of the sale of the planes and
shuttle route to Rich Dude. (Nos. 4 and 5 on the graphic.)
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XIII. EFFECT OF DISCHARGE: DEBTS DIE, BUT LIENS LIVE
A debtor's discharge in bankruptcy voids any personal obligation of
the debtor to pay the discharged debt.27
But otherwise unavoided liens,28 which pre-date the bankruptcy, are
not canceled along with discharge of the personal obligation to pay the
debt.29 In other words, a judgment lien on farm real estate, a mortgage lien
on a house, a security interest in a tractor, a mechanic's lien on a construc-
tion project, etc., all will survive bankruptcy, and after the bankruptcy
discharge, the secured creditor is entitled to foreclose the lien or repossess
the property (although the creditor is no longer allowed to pursue the debtor
personally for the obligation).
Debtor's counsel must be careful to advise debtor clients that unless
they reaffirm debts secured by a lien on their property, the debtors will lose
their property through foreclosure or repossession after the bankruptcy dis-
charge, even though the debtors have discharged their personal obligation to
pay the debts from their own resources. The property will still be vulner-
able and available to the creditor's grasp.
In North Dakota, a State Clerk of District Court may accept a certified
copy of a Federal Bankruptcy Discharge for filing at the courthouse, and
that has the effect of preventing the lien of a judgment from attaching to
property acquired after the debtor's bankruptcy, and also has the effect of
removing any judgment lien as a cloud on the debtor's homestead.30 Note,
however, that pre-bankruptcy judgment liens remain in full force and effect
on land in existence prior to the debtor's bankruptcy.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000).
28. Certain liens do not survive bankruptcy if they are properly avoided and cancelled by the
debtor or the trustee. By motion, the debtor in a "fresh start lien avoidance" may cancel non-
purchase money security interests and judicial liens on property, which the debtor would
otherwise be able to exempt. II U.S.C. § 522(f) (2000). The trustee is able to cancel liens, which
were granted to or obtained by a creditor on a preferential basis during the ninety days prior to
bankruptcy under the unavoidable preference rule of Bankruptcy Code § 547. See II U.S.C. §
547 (2000). The trustee can avoid liens that meet the criteria of being a fraudulent transfer under
Bankruptcy Code § 548. See 11 U.S.C. § 548. Additionally, under the "strong arm clause" of
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a), the trustee can avoid liens that are not timely or properly recorded or
perfected. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000). Additional lien avoidance powers are found in II
U.S.C. §§ 547 (e), 548 (d), and 545.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 524.
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20-30 (2004).
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